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Establishing a reasonable price for an orphan 
drug
Mikel Berdud1* , Michael Drummond2  and Adrian Towse1
Abstract 
Background: This paper addresses the question of what a reasonable price for an orphan drug is. The research pro-
poses a way to adjust an established payer/HTA body incremental cost-effectiveness threshold (CET) to take account 
of differences in patient populations and costs of research and development in order to sustain prices that generate 
rates of return from investments in developing orphan drugs that are no greater than the industry average.
Methods: We investigated the cost of conducting research for orphan drugs as compared to non-orphan drugs, as 
well as patient population sizes targeted by orphans and non-orphans. We provided an empirical illustration based on 
novel drug approvals of orphan and non-orphan drugs of the FDA between 2011 and 2015 (N = 182).
Results: Using, for illustration, the NICE incremental CET (£20 K per QALY) as an anchor and adjusting by R&D costs 
and expected market revenue, we estimated the adjusted reasonable CET for orphan drugs to be £39.1 K per QALY at 
the orphan population cut-off and £78.3 K per QALY at the orphan population mid-point. For ultra-orphan drugs the 
adjusted CET was £937.1 K.
Conclusions: We propose one general method for establishing a reasonable price for an orphan drug, based on the 
proposition that rates of return for investments in developing orphan drugs should not be greater than the industry 
average. More research is required on data and assumptions, but with the data and assumptions we use, we find 
that in order to secure such a reasonable price for an orphan drug, the CET for orphans would need to be higher. 
This could be one approach for establishing the maximum allowable price society should be willing to pay, although 
decision-makers may still wish to negotiate a lower price, or refuse to pay such a premium over the value-based price 
in order to treat these groups of patients.
Keywords: Orphan drugs, Reasonable price, Value-based pricing, Rate of return, Cost-effectiveness threshold, R&D 
costs
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Background
The high cost of drugs for rare diseases (often known as 
orphan drugs) has generated considerable debate.1Many 
health economists argue that there is no justification for a 
premium for ‘rarity’ and that, in terms of reimbursement 
decisions (i.e. public subsidy), orphan drugs should not be 
judged any differently from drugs for common diseases. 
Given the current trend towards value-based pricing, this 
implies that orphan drugs should demonstrate that they 
Open Access
Cost Effectiveness and 
Resource Allocation
*Correspondence:  mberdud@ohe.org
1 Office of Health Economics, Southside 7th, 105 Victoria St., 
London SW1E 6QT, UK
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
1 According to the European Medicines Agency’s (EMA), rare diseases are 
defined as life-threatening or chronically debilitating conditions that affect no 
more than 5 in 10,000 people in the EU (25 in 50,000 people). Orphan desig-
nations are granted by EMA to medicines that target to treat rare diseases. 
See: http://www.ema.europ a.eu/ema/index .jsp?curl=pages /regul ation /gener 
al/gener al_conte nt_00002 9.jsp&mid=WC0b0 1ac05 80b18 a41. In addition, the 
Scottish Medicines Consortium (SMC) and the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) define ultra-orphan drugs as medicines that have 
been granted by the EMA with the orphan status and target to treat condi-
tions with a prevalence of 1 in 50,000 people in England and/or Scotland. See: 
https ://www.scott ishme dicin es.org.uk/media /2782/pace-overv iew-docum ent.
pdf.
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represent good value for money when judged by con-
ventional criteria. Otherwise, society would be sacrific-
ing overall health gain in order to make these therapies 
available [1]. However, in practice this policy would lead 
to most orphan drugs being denied reimbursement [2].
Other economists have argued that there may be char-
acteristics of orphan drugs that might justify departing 
from the standard value for money criteria [3]. These 
additional characteristics could relate to the severity of 
the health condition and the absence of alternative effec-
tive therapies [4]. However, surveys of the general public 
mostly suggest that there is no willingness to pay a pre-
mium for rarity, although there may be a case for paying 
more for drugs to treat severe conditions, or where there 
is unmet need [5, 6].
Although the question of whether society should allow 
the reimbursement of orphan drugs is an important issue, 
the reality is that orphan drugs are currently being reim-
bursed in many jurisdictions [7]. In some jurisdictions they 
are not subjected to the same level of scrutiny, through 
health technology assessment (HTA), as other drugs. In 
jurisdictions that apply HTA broadly to most health tech-
nologies, the willingness-to-pay cost-effectiveness thresh-
old (CET) may be set at a higher level [8]. However, Coté 
and Keating [9] argue that there is a risk that manufac-
turers will exploit society’s willingness to pay for therapy 
in  situations where individuals have no other effective 
therapy. They argue that many orphan drugs appear to be 
very profitable to manufacturers, that manufacturers may 
deliberately create situations whereby their drug could be 
designated ‘orphan’ and that many orphan drugs are mar-
keted for multiple indications, which taken in their total-
ity would not lead the drug to be designated orphan. In 
support of these arguments, Hughes and Polleti-Hughes 
[10] estimate that companies holding orphan drug market 
authorizations generate a higher return on assets.
If health care decision-makers are to provide funding 
for orphan drugs, they require reassurance that the prices 
being charged by manufacturers are not ‘excessive’. Differ-
ent jurisdictions approach the pricing of drugs in differ-
ent ways. In France and Germany, the price is determined 
by an assessment of the clinical data, followed by a nego-
tiation. In several other European countries, including 
the United Kingdom, a ‘valued-based price’ is determined 
by assessing the cost-effectiveness of the drug and com-
paring this with the decision-maker’s CET, which repre-
sents the maximum amount that decision-makers would 
be willing to pay for given unit of health gain (such as a 
quality-adjusted life-year). Of course, the value-based 
pricing rule could be supplemented by negotiation, or, as 
indicated above, the CET could be set at a higher level 
for orphan drugs. However, in making these adjustments 
decision-makers would still need some ‘benchmarks’ to 
use in a negotiation.
One possible benchmark might be one based on the 
proposition that the manufacturers of orphan drugs 
should not make higher profits than manufacturers of 
drugs for non-orphan conditions. That is, the prices paid 
should not lead to rates of return from investments in 
developing orphan drugs in excess of the pharmaceutical 
industry average, after adjustments for risk and any other 
relevant factors. Using the UK as an example, this paper 
illustrates the implied adjustment that would need to be 
made to the CET should decision-makers wish to use this 
as a guide for setting prices.
Methods
The two major differences between orphan and non-
orphan drugs are that (i) the costs of research and devel-
opment are likely to be lower for orphan drugs, as the 
clinical development programme is less extensive,2 and 
(ii) the treatment populations for orphan drugs are likely 
to be smaller, given the rarity of disease. Therefore, in 
order to determine a reasonable price for an orphan drug, 
we investigated the cost of conducting research into rare 
diseases, as compared with non-orphan conditions. We 
then investigated the adjustment that would need to be 
made to a payer’s “normal” CET for non-orphan drugs in 
order to achieve the industry-wide rate of return, in rela-
tion to the expected size of the treatment population. For 
illustrative purposes we use the UK threshold used by 
National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) 
in England and Wales and the Scottish Medicines Consor-
tium (SMC) in Scotland and relative population numbers 
for the orphan and non-orphan treatments reviewed by 
these two bodies.
A reasonable price for an orphan drug
We based our proposed approach on the assumption 
that, as the target population size of a medicine goes 
down, the revenue generated also goes down unless the 
drug price increases to counter the effect of lower sales 
volumes. On the other hand, it is also likely that the R&D 
cost of a drug for a rare disease, is lower than for a non-
orphan drug, because smaller numbers of patients are 
available for recruitment to clinical trials.
2 We focus on the number of patients as the main driver of clinical trials costs 
to account for potential differentials of R&D costs that we use for the adjust-
ment. However, we acknowledge that clinical trials for orphan medicines are 
likely to be more difficult to run than clinical trials for non-orphan medicines. 
Recruiting rare disease and ultra-rare disease patients could be extremely dif-
ficult, imposing additional costs. Not considering these costs implies that the 
adjustment of the CET estimated in this work is conservative, given that we 
only consider the differences in trial patient numbers, not potential differ-
ences in the cost per patient in orphan versus non-orphan trials.
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We propose a reasonable price as one generated by 
these two opposing effects, affecting, on the one hand, 
revenue, and, on the other hand, the cost of drug devel-
opment and commercialisation, in a way that its rate of 
return is approximately equal to the rate of return of a 
drug for a common disease.
Rather than just estimating how much higher or lower 
the price of an orphan drug should be because of these 
opposing adjustments, we have expressed the reasonable 
price in terms of the change that might be required in the 
CET which determines the maximum allowable price for 
a drug. The reason for this approach is that one would 
expect all drugs to produce health-related gains, whether 
designated orphan or not, but the ‘acceptable’ level of 
that threshold may vary depending on the designation. 
For simplicity we assume that all of the benefits of drugs 
can be expressed in QALYs. A formal development of 
our approach is available in Appendix 1 of this paper. In 
the appendix a general equation is presented in the first 
instance in Eq. (4) and then a simpler approach is derived 
from it in Eqs. (5) and (6) by applying asssumptions. The 
simpler approach is used for the practical adjustment 
exercise presented in the following sections of the paper.
Finally, it should be noted that the general approach—
even in its simple form—considers global figures of both 
costs and revenues for non-orphan and orphan devel-
opers. In applying the approach to a particular country 
or market, these estimates will need to be appropriately 
adjusted to reflect the country’s share of the global mar-
ket. We make additional assumptions to implement the 
general approach to a particular country or market. 
We assume that (i) the CET in any given country has 
been appropriately determined3 (ii) the ratios of patient 
numbers for a typical orphan or ultra-orphan drug, as 
compared to a non-orphan in a particular country are 
the relevant ratios and (iii) the share of the total global 
pharmaceutical market for all products represented by a 
country’s market is the relevant share of global R&D that 
should be charged to that market.4,5
Research and development cost
All novel drug approvals completed by the Food and 
Drug Administration (FDA) in the period 2011–2015 
were considered for the study (n = 182).6 The sample 
was divided into two groups: those approved under the 
orphan designation, and those approved under non-
orphan designations. Within the orphan and non-orphan 
drug groups, the sample was also divided into oncology 
and non-oncology drugs, since in many jurisdictions 
oncology drugs indicated for small patient populations 
(possibly because of targeted therapy), are not treated 
differently for reimbursement, even though they may be 
technically ‘orphan’.
In order to estimate any difference between the cost of 
developing an orphan and a non-orphan drug, we inves-
tigated the cost of conducting research for all novel drug 
approvals issued in 2015. For this subsample, data on the 
number of patients involved in clinical trials was col-
lected from ClinicalTrials.gov.7 For each drug, we iden-
tified the number of patients in clinical trials involved 
at the different phases of development (e.g. phases I, II 
and III) for the molecule designated as orphan drug and 
the specific orphan indication. Within medicines desig-
nated as orphan and non-orphan, we also distinguished 
between medicines approved for oncology and non-
oncology indications.
For the estimation of the cost of developing a drug we 
used the estimates produced by Mestre-Ferrandiz and 
colleagues [14] who followed the standard methodol-
ogy established in related literature [15, 16].8 Mestre-
Ferrandiz and colleagues estimate the R&D cost of a new 
drug based on the impact of four cost drivers: out-of-
pocket costs, time of development, cost of capital, and 
failure rates of development. Figure  1 shows a detailed 
explanation of the estimation method.
We searched the literature for estimates of the per-
patient cost in clinical trials. We found a per-patient trial 
cost—only trial site related costs—in the report by Batelle 
Memorial Institute [18] for Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA).9 We estimated 
3 For a discussion of the issues involved in setting the CET see [11, 12]. Fur-
ther discussion in setting CET in any individual jurisdiction in order to signal 
the optimal amount of R&D is given in [13].
4 There is always the possibility that the size of a country’s market is not 
driven by the appropriate CET, but by a desire to free-ride on paying for 
R&D costs. Of course, it is also possible that a country is overpaying for 
drugs, given the underlying population willingness to pay for health gain.
5 There is no established method to apportion the global joint R&D costs 
of a drug between different countries in the relevant literature. Neither 
the global pharmaceutical companies, nor governments have a method to 
attribute R&D costs to each country. We applied the country market share 
of the total global market value as a proxy of the relevant country share of 
the global R&D cost as one possible approach while we recognise that there 
could be alternatives i.e. using the country market share of the market value 
of the high-income countries.
6 We use FDA novel drugs approval data for the adjustment of the R&D 
cost. The clinical development of new medicines is global and not subject to 
particular locations. The FDA database is the most comprehensive database, 
easily accessible and of high quality. Database provides information about 
orphan designation, first in class, breakthrough therapy designation, fast 
track, priority review. http://www.fda.gov/Drugs /Devel opmen tAppr ovalP 
roces s/DrugI nnova tion/ucm43 0302.htm.
7 https ://clini caltr ials.gov/.
8 See [17] for a review of the literature on the topic of estimating the R&D 
cost of a new medicine.
9 Moore and colleagues [19] also provide cost estimates of pivotal clinical 
trials by several factors including number of patients. They also show that 
cost increases with the number of patients. Our per patient cost estimates 
based on [18] are lower which makes our CET estimate lower.
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the out-of-pocket cost by multiplying average number 
of patients in clinical trials and per-patient costs. We 
extracted data of Probability of Success (PoS) from the 
Biomedtracker, Pharmapremia database for the period 
9/2009–9/2019. This is the same database and methodol-
ogy used for other published studies [20, 21] updated to 
cover the most recent 10  year period.10 PoS for orphan 
drugs are estimated based on a sample of 1206 clinical 
trials (525 for oncology orphans). PoS for non-orphans is 
estimated based on a sample of 7746 clinical trials (2473 
for oncology non-orphans). Finally, we kept unchanged 
the cost-of-capital from the original modelling of Mestre-
Ferrandiz and colleagues [14] because this input has not 
been subject to significant changes in newer estimations 
of the cost of R&D using similar methods and published 
in the literature [16, 17]. We updated the model with the 
most recent estimates of the time of development for 
development phases 1, 2 and 3 [16]. As times for clinical 
development for orphan drugs and non-orphan drugs are 
not considered to be significantly different [23], we have 
used the same estimates for both.
Although very important, the costs of R&D are only one 
component of the cost of bringing a new drug to market. 
In addition, there are costs in manufacturing, market-
ing and distribution. It is not known whether these other 
costs are also lower for orphan drugs, or whether they are 
the same as for non-orphan products. Therefore, different 
assumptions were made about the potential reduction in 
these other costs for orphans and ultra-orphans and their 
impact explored in a sensitivity analysis.
Patient population size
In order to adjust the CET (or the price), by the volumes 
for companies developing orphan drugs, we searched 
for data on target patient populations of both, orphan 
and non-orphan drugs. To gather this information, we 
consulted SMC and NICE appraisals, which often give 
estimates of the potential treatment population for 
the technologies being appraised.11 We considered all 
Fig. 1 Summary of Mestre-Ferrandiz et al. [14] method to estimate the R&D cost of a new medicine (Source: Authors research based on 
Mestre-Ferrandiz et al. [14])
10 The most recent published work, Wong and colleagues [22], uses data from 
Trialtrove and clinicaltrials.gov in addition to Biomedtracker. The authors 
apply a different methodology to estimate the PoS based on total programs 
and transitions. Their estimated PoS are lower than ours. This means that our 
estimate of the R&D cost of an orphan drug is lower than the estimate that 
would result from applying the PoS figures in [22].
11 We use NICE and SMC technology appraisal (TA) data to adjust the 
CET by treatment population size (revenue) because they often include 
treatment population data and budget impact analysis with a 1 to 5  years 
of time horizon. In addition, there is a wide overlap between FDA’s novel 
drug approvals and drugs whose TAs by NICE and SMC include treatment 
population data.
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technology appraisals conducted during the period Janu-
ary 2011–March 2017.
At the time of the study, some drugs for rare conditions 
were being appraised by the Advisory Group for National 
Specialised Services (AGNSS), (see https ://www.nice.org.uk/
news/artic le/nice-to-asses s-high-cost-drugs -for-rare-condi 
tions ). NICE was, however, appraising some cancer drugs 
for small patient populations that were designated ‘orphan’. 
We found data for patient populations from a total number 
of 48 SMC appraisals (24 orphans and 24 non-orphans) and 
33 NICE appraisals (11 orphans and 22 non-orphans). Drugs 
appraised by both SMC and NICE, amounted to a total 
number of 21 drugs (7 orphans and 14 non-orphans).
In order to make the patient population data from both 
sources comparable we standardised by dividing by the 
total population of England12 and Scotland,13 and then 
multiplying by 50,000 to make the resulting rates per 
50,000 comparable with the European Union orphan des-
ignation. Finally, although we assumed that orphan drugs 
would achieve sales to 100% of the potential patient pop-
ulation, for non-orphans we assumed that they would 
only achieve sales to 50%, because of the potential for in-
class competition.
Cost‑effectiveness estimates and appraisal decisions
We also obtained data on the incremental cost effective-
ness ratios (ICERs) of appraised medicines included in our 
sample, along with the appraisal decisions (recommended 
or not recommended). The main purpose of collecting 
actual ICERs and decisions was to understand what NICE 
and SMC had actually decided and discuss these decisions 
in relation to our adjusted CET method to establish a pro-
posed reasonable price for an orphan drug.
Health technology appraisals of NICE often present 
more than one ICER. In such cases we followed the algo-
rithm developed in [24] for the selection of the most 
plausible ICER. This method is a rank-based selection 
process which selects the ICER in the following order:
1 The ICER clearly adopted by NICE for decision mak-
ing purposes;
2 The estimate given by NICE’s Decision Support Unit 
(in cases where the DSU was consulted);
3 The estimate given by the Evidence Review Group 
(ERG) report;
4 The estimate provided by the manufacturer.
The SMC also often presents more than one ICER in 
appraisals (i.e. sensitivity analyses, changes in the model-
ling). However, since the decision is taken based on what 
appraisal committee consider the most plausible ICER 
after a detailed discussion of the estimate provided by 
the manufacturer, rather than an estimate produced by 
an independent review group, we selected that estimate. 
For both NICE and the SMC, the ICERs in appraisals 
take into account confidential discounts offered through 
‘Patient Access Schemes’.
Results
Novel drug approvals by designation and indication
Table 1 gives details of the NDAs made by the FDA for 
the period 2011–2015. It can be seen that around 40% of 
all approvals were for orphan drugs and that around 50% 
of all approvals were oncology products.
Research and development cost
Based on the data for 2015 novel drug approvals, a signif-
icantly greater number of patients were enrolled in clini-
cal trials for non-orphan drugs as compared to orphan 
drugs. This is as expected; orphan drugs target rare dis-
eases, so the size of the treatment populations must be 
lower. Therefore, the average sample size for the clini-
cal trials is also likely to be lower, because of the chal-
lenges of recruiting patients. The main difference occurs 
in phase III trials, where the effectiveness of the drug is 
typically tested on larger samples of patients in order to 
demonstrate a statistically significant difference in rela-
tive treatment effect. Figure 2 shows differences both by 
development phase and in total.14
However, for oncology products no significant differ-
ences in patient numbers were observed between medi-
cines designated orphan or non-orphan, suggesting that 
the evidentiary standards are similar across all cancer 
indications. See Fig. 3.
Table 1 Distribution of  novel drug approvals 
by  designation and  indication. Source: FDA, Novel Drugs 
Approvals 2011–2015
Non‑oncology Oncology Total
Orphan drugs 36 35 71
Non-orphan drugs 58 53 111
Total 94 88 182
12 ’Mid-2013 Population Estimates for Clinical Commissioning Groups 
(CCGs) and NHS area teams in England by Single Year of Age and Sex (exper-
imental statistics) and NHS Area teams’ for the total population of England: 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/searc h/index .html?newqu ery=01cur rccg.
13 Mid-year 2016 estimate from National Records of Scotland (NRS): https 
://www.nrsco tland .gov.uk/stati stics -and-data/stati stics /stati stics -by-theme /
popul ation /popul ation -estim ates/mid-year-popul ation -estim ates/mid-2016.
14 For a depiction of variability in the number of patients in trials see Appen-
dix 2 where box-and-whisker plots are shown in Fig.  6. Appendix 2 shows 
data for all indications only.
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The size of clinical trials is one of the main determi-
nants of the out-of-pocket cost of developing a drug and 
therefore the R&D cost of developing an orphan drug 
must be lower than that of a non-orphan drug.
The other factor we take into account is the difference 
in the overall development success rate (defined in terms 
of the proportion of drugs obtaining a market authori-
zation from FDA), which is a key driver of overall R&D 
cost. As per our database, this was 34.6% for orphans and 
5.9% for non-orphans. This difference is driven by oncol-
ogy indications, where the orphans’ cumulative success 
rate was 28.5%, but only 2.4% for oncology non-orphan 
drugs. One can only speculate why this might be the case. 
One possibility is that targeting smaller patient popula-
tions, often based on a gene expression test, increases the 
chances of success.
Using our estimates of out-of-pocket costs and success 
rates from the literature, we estimated the R&D costs 
based on the model developed in [12]. These estimates, 
set out in Table 2, should be viewed with caution as they 
are based on a small sample. However, they do suggest 
possible differences in the R&D costs for orphan and 
non-orphan drugs.15
One point to note when considering the results in 
Table  2 is that the R&D cost of a non-orphan drug for 
oncology indications is near five times the R&D cost of an 
orphan drug for oncology, despite the number of patients 
in clinical trials being similar (Fig.  3).16 This reflects 
the lower probability of success, so more non-orphan 
oncology projects need to be started to achieve one suc-
cessful licensed product.
Overall, we estimated the R&D cost of an orphan to 
be around the 23% of the cost of a non-orphan, which 
is in line with what is argued in [9], and close to what 
is reported in [25, 26] whose estimates of the phase III 
cost of an orphan are around a 25% of the phase III cost 
of a non-orphan. In order to estimate the relative lifecy-
cle costs of producing orphan and non-orphan drugs it 
is necessary to determine whether all the other costs (in 
manufacturing, marketing and distribution) are reduced 
by a corresponding amount. If that is not the case, it 
would be necessary to estimate what proportion R&D 
costs are of the total.
The newest estimate we have found in the literature 
shows that R&D costs represent 34% of total lifecycle 
costs [27] which is in line with the 30% figure in [28], 
a study published in 1997. Therefore, for the base case 
estimate we produced adjustments of cost-effective-
ness thresholds by applying Eqs.  (5) and (6) based on 
two alternative assumptions: (i) for ultra-orphans we 
assume that all drug lifecycle costs were reduced by 
the same proportion as R&D costs, and (ii) for regu-
lar orphans only 34% of lifecycle costs were reduced 

















Phase I Phase II Phase III Total
Development phases and sum of all phases (total)  
Orphan (21) Non-Orphan (24)
Fig. 2 Average number of patients by orphan and non-orphan 


















Phase I Phase II Phase III Total
Development phases and sum of all phases (total)
Oncology Orphan (11) Oncology non-orphan (3)
Fig. 3 Average number of patients by orphan and non-orphan 
designation for oncology medicines (Source: ClinicalTrials.gov)
Table 2 Estimated R&D cost of  a  new drug FDA (US$ 
millions). Source: Authors’ calculations
Estimates have been calculated using data from 2015 novel drug approvals of 
FDA; Estimates for all indications include oncology products





All indications 501.2 2140.8 23.4
Oncology 511.6 2341.5 21.8
15 Estimates of the R&D cost of an orphan drug do not take account of any 
form of push incentives given in the US by the Orphan Drug Act of 1983 in 
the form of federal grants to subsidize drug R&D investments and tax credits.
16 Data of PoS for orphan and non-orphan oncology indications are avail-
able in Appendix 3.
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being equivalent for regular orphan and non-orphan 
drugs. The first approach produces more conserva-
tive estimates, as the greater adjustment to the drug 
lifecycle cost cancels out a greater proportion of the 
revenue adjustment in our formula, thereby resulting 
in a lower adjusted CET. However, because we are not 
sure which assumption is more appropriate, we pre-
sent the adjusted CETs for orphan and ultra-orphan 
drugs resulting from both approaches in a sensitivity 
analysis.
Resulting average patient population per 50,000 inhab-
itants for an orphan drug, 2.54 in SMC appraisals and 
2.91 in NICE appraisals, is quite similar. However, the 
same figure for non-orphans, 82.8 in SMC appraisals and 
102.57 in NICE appraisals, is 25% higher in England than 
in Scotland. This may be due to the small sample size, the 
different subsets of drugs appraised by the two organi-
sations, or other country-specific demographic or epi-
demiologic factors. However, for both SMC and NICE, 
the average patient population is much lower for orphan 
drugs. Assuming that potential revenues are related to 
patient populations, a reasonable price for orphans would 
need to take account of these differences.
Estimating the reasonable price for an orphan drug
Using our estimates of differences in R&D costs and 
treatment populations for orphan and non-orphans and 
applying our proposal of a reasonable price as set out 
in Eqs.  (5) and (6), we can estimate adjusted CETs cor-
responding to orphan and ultra-orphan drugs. Although 
estimates of orphan and non-orphan population sizes 
presented in Table  3 show some degree of variability 
between SMC and NICE, for the base case we use the 
NICE estimate of non-orphan patient population size for 
the adjustments, rounded to 100 per 50,000 inhabitants. 
In a sensitivity analysis we explore the impact of differ-
ent assumptions about the size of the non-orphan patient 
population.
Adjustments of the CET have been made for both 
orphan designation and ‘ultra-orphan’ drugs. For the 
adjustment of the revenue for orphans and ultra-orphans, 
we have calculated the average adjusted CETs taking the 
‘cut-off’ point populations of orphan and ultra-orphan 
drugs as well as the mid-point cut-off orphan popula-
tion17 and average non-orphan population used in NICE 
appraisals. These population sizes are set out in Table 3, 
standardised by population and in absolute numbers. 
To estimate the absolute populations, we first multi-
ply standardised numbers by the UK population (less 
Scotland) in NICE technology appraisals and, second, we 
divide the resulting number by 50,000.
To estimate the adjusted CET applying (5) and (6) we 
have made several assumptions which enable us to esti-
mate the adjustment for the UK:
1 The £20,000/QALY threshold currently used by 
NICE is the appropriate starting point.
2 The corresponding weights of global R&D cost and 
operational variable cost relevant to the UK market 
are proportional to the UK’s market share of global 
pharmaceutical sales.18
3 Patent expiration time is 10 years after market launch 
time ( TEx = TL + 10).
4 Non-orphan drugs only achieve 50% of their poten-
tial sales due to in-class competition.19
5 A discount rate of 11% is used for revenues20 (same 
as used for the estimation of R&D cost).
R&D costs, other costs and revenues (populations) 
have been discounted to the present value at the time 
period ( t = 0 ) when research starts.
Figure 4 shows the adjusted the CETs for three different 
population sizes of orphan drugs shown in Table 3: orphan 
cut-off population, orphan mid-point population and 
ultra-orphan cut-off population. Using the NICE incre-
mental cost-effectiveness threshold (£20 K per QALY) as 
an anchor and adjusting by R&D costs and expected mar-
ket revenue, we estimated the adjusted reasonable CET for 
orphan drugs to be £39.1 K per QALY at the orphan popu-
lation cut-off and £78.3 K per QALY at the orphan popula-
tion mid-point. For ultra-orphan drugs the adjusted CET 
resulted in £937.1  K. To calculate the ultra-orphan cut-
off point adjusted CET, we make the conservative (lower 
Table 3 Non-orphan, orphan and ultra-orphan population 




Orphan cut-off population 25 26,932
Orphan mid-point population 12.5 13,462
Ultra-orphan cut-off population 1 1077
Non-orphan average 100 107,732
17 Orphan mid-point population is the median point between the orphan 
population cut-off point and zero.
18 Data of 2015 market share of the UK has been taken from the IMS World 
Review Executive™ 2016.
19 We assume same length for patent for non-orphan drugs but without 
market exclusivity.
20 Since we are basing the adjustment of the CET on the need to guarantee 
orphan drugs developers the same rate of return of the industry’s average, a 
discount rate of 11% is used—the same used by private organisations for their 
financial calculations.
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CET) assumption that the operational costs (e.g. manu-
facturing, marketing, commercialisation) decrease in the 
same proportion as the R&D cost decrease.
We also have calculated adjusted CETs for oncol-
ogy products for the same three population sizes but 
adjusting by their specific R&D cost as shown in Table 2. 
Adjusted CETs for oncology orphans were almost equal 
to the adjusted CETs for all orphans: £41.4 k for orphan 
cut-off population, £82.9  k for orphan mid-point popu-
lation and £1107.4 k for ultra-orphan cut-off population. 
The similarity of results is because the weight of the R&D 
cost in determining the reasonable price is relatively low 
compared to the weight of population size.
Actual decisions made by NICE and SMC
Table  4 shows the average ICERs of the orphan and 
non-orphan drugs appraised by both NICE and SMC, 
for all the drugs appraised and for those that were 
recommended.21
In general, the ICERs for orphan drugs are higher than 
the ICERs for non-orphans. Considering only the rec-
ommended drugs, the same pattern emerges, but with 
a smaller difference in the ICERs for orphans and non-
orphans. For the recommended drugs the ICERs of 
orphans are almost 2 times higher for orphans than for 
non-orphans.
These data suggest that both organizations may be 
implicitly adjusting their willingness to pay for medicines 
that target rare diseases, although in the case of NICE 
the decisions made on oncology drugs (orphan and non-
orphan) will also be influenced by application of the End-
of-Life (EoL) guidance.
In Fig. 5 we have superimposed our adjusted cost-effec-
tiveness thresholds on the actual decisions by the SMC 
and by NICE in order to see how the proposed adjusted 
thresholds from our approach compare with SMC’s and 
NICE’s decisions. All observations for non-orphans 
whose populations exceed the orphan population cut-off 
point, present ICERs below (or quite close to) the stand-


























Fig. 4 Adjusted cost effectiveness thresholds (Source: Authors calculations)
Table 4 Average ICER of  orphan and  non-orphan drugs. 
Sources: SMC https ://www.scott ishme dicin es.org.uk/; NICE 
https ://www.nice.org.uk/
SMC NICE
Orphan drugs (all) £68,064 £73,530
Non-orphan drugs (all) £24,090 £24,840
Orphan drugs (recommended) £45,622 £43,918
Non-orphan drugs (recommended) £22,813 £24,207
21 The purpose of considering ICERs from both SMC and NICE was not to 
make comparisons of ICERs between the two organisations, but to make com-
parisons between the ICERs for orphan and non-orphan drugs based on each 
data source. The use of data from two different sources provides a better indi-
cation of whether there is a consistent pattern between the ICERs of orphan 
and non-orphan drugs.
22 Outlier observations showing either too large populations (all non-
orphans) or too large ICERs (all ultra-orphans) have been excluded from 
the graph in order to keep a comparable scale. Five outliers have been 
excluded.
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To assess the impact of the assumptions made to esti-
mate the adjusted CETs, a sensitivity analysis was con-
ducted. Additional to the impact of the assumptions 
made on the different population sizes of non-orphans, 
orphans and ultra-orphans, we also explored the impact 
on the results of other assumptions applied, in particular, 
those regarding the market exclusivity period for orphan 
drugs and the degree of in-class competition. None of 
the assumptions have a major impact on results. The 
assumption about the degree of in-class competition for 
non-orphans, implying a reduction of the population size 
of 50%, has the largest impact. Details of the sensitivity 
analysis are provided in Appendix 4.
Discussion
Our analysis does not indicate what society should be 
prepared to pay for an orphan drug. Rather, in this paper 
we propose a method for establishing a reasonable price 
for an orphan drug in  situations where a value-based 
price is deemed inappropriate. The method rests on the 
proposition that, although societal decision-makers may 
be willing to pay above their standard value-based price 
to make treatments for some orphan diseases available, 
they would still need a benchmark for use in price nego-
tiations. One possible guide for setting prices would be 
to ensure that the manufacturers of orphan drugs do not 
make higher profits than manufacturers of drugs for non-
orphan conditions. In order to establish a price based 
on this proposition, we have examined, for illustrative 
purposes, how the standard incremental cost-per-QALY 
cost-effectiveness threshold (CET) in the UK would 
need to be adjusted to reflect typical differences between 
orphan and non-orphan products in both (i) the costs of 
R&D and (ii) in the size of the expected treatment popu-
lation. Whilst we recognize that there may be concerns 
about how well the QALY captures the value of the health 
gain for some rare conditions, we regard the (cost-per-
QALY) CET as an effective tool for illustrating our rea-
sonable price approach.
It is important to stress that our analysis does not indi-
cate what society should be prepared to pay for an orphan 
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Fig. 5 Adjusted cost-effectiveness thresholds and NICE-SMC decisions to recommend. The line that relates population sizes to adjusted CET by 
connecting our adjusted CETs of this figure goes to the point of the ultra-orphan CET (£937 k/QALY) (Sources: NICE (https ://www.nice.org.uk/), SMC 
(https ://www.scott ishme dicin es.org.uk/) and authors’ calculations)
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about whether some population health in total should 
be forgone in order to provide funding for treatments 
for rare conditions and, if so, how much. Rather, our 
approach could be viewed as one way of determining the 
maximum allowable price society should be willing to 
pay, based on allowing a reasonable rate of return. Thus, 
it might be used as a starting point for negotiations. 
Awarding a lower price would send a signal to manufac-
turers about the level of priority being assigned to the 
treatment of orphan conditions. We return to this point 
later.
While we believe our proposed method has some 
merit, it is evident that further research is required in 
order to improve the estimates produced. First, in esti-
mating the costs of R&D, we only sampled novel drugs 
approved by the FDA in 2015. A larger sample, covering 
more years, might have generated different estimates of 
the relative research costs for orphans and non-orphans. 
Second, post-approval R&D costs (phase IV) should be 
included as they may differ as between ultra-orphan, 
orphan and non-orphan and would imply differences in 
the relative R&D cost estimates. However, our estimates, 
showing a lower R&D cost for orphan products, are con-
sistent with those in earlier studies [9]. In addition, we 
show that the difference in the research cost between 
orphans and non-orphans is smaller for oncology prod-
ucts. This is consistent with our expectations, given that 
the research requirements for all oncology drugs are sim-
ilar, with both orphan and non-orphan products being 
eligible for the FDA’s ‘fast track’ programmes for innova-
tive drugs i.e. ‘Accelerated Approval’ and ‘Breakthrough 
Therapy’ [29]. These programmes often grant market 
approval based on less mature clinical data.
Second, we made assumptions about the differences 
in drug lifecycle costs other than R&D. Our simplest 
assumption was that only R&D costs, representing 34% 
of the total drug lifecycle costs, would be lower, with all 
other costs being the same for both orphan and non-
orphan drugs. An alternative approach is to assume that 
the costs of manufacturing, marketing or distribution dif-
fered in the same proportion as R&D costs as orphans 
and non-orphans. This is the most conservative approach 
and produces slightly lower estimates of the adjusted 
CETs. Marketing and distributing an orphan drug to a 
small group of identified individuals, may be lower per 
patient than for a non-orphan drug. The truth is probably 
somewhere between these two extremes. However, since 
the assumption concerning the level of reduction (if any) 
in non-R&D costs makes a substantial difference to the 
adjusted CETs, these estimates should be verified by fur-
ther research.
Third, we haven’t included the tax credit of the 50% 
of the phase III clinical testing costs for orphan drugs 
included in the US Orphan Drug Act of 198323 and 
which remained unchanged until 2018, when reduced to 
27.5%.24 Although in principle it could have an impact on 
our estimates of R&D cost for an orphan drug and con-
sequently could reduce the adjusted CET for an orphan, 
the numerical impact is minor, since we are apportioning 
global R&D costs to the UK by the global market share 
of pharmaceutical sales. Furthermore, the tax credit will 
not be applicable for drug development based in Europe 
and Asia. Other push incentives given by governments, 
governmental agencies, product development partner-
ships and philanthropic donors are neither included 
in the estimation of the R&D cost of orphan medicines 
nor of non-orphans. These other push incentives are not 
orphan drug specific and therefore we assume they have 
a neutral effect on the relative R&D costs of orphans and 
non-orphans.
Fourth, the estimates of the costs of R&D are highly 
sensitive to the success rates in the development of new 
products. In our sample of oncology drugs, the numbers 
of patients in the different phases of clinical research 
were similar for orphans and non-orphans. However, 
applying different estimates of the success rate (2.4% for 
non-orphans and 28.5% for orphans) led to differences 
in overall R&D cost.25 While there might be reasons to 
expect a higher success rate for orphans, given the more 
precise targeting of therapy, this issue requires further 
investigation.
Fifth, we used estimates of target patient popula-
tions given in technology appraisals performed by the 
SMC and NICE in the UK. These may not reflect typical 
patient populations for the drugs studied for two reasons. 
First, in the case of orphan drugs, it is possible that some 
would also be indicated for larger, non-orphan popula-
tions, negating the argument for an adjusted threshold to 
compensate for a smaller treatment population [9]. In the 
case of the non-orphan drugs studied, the appraisal con-
ducted by NICE or the SMC may have focused on a sub-
set of the total population for the licensed indication for 
the drug concerned. For example, for oncology products 
in particular, it is common for a technology appraisal to 
focus on a given stage of disease, even if the product is 
licensed for other stages.
This issue was harder to investigate, but we did note 
that a small number (10) of the non-orphan oncology 
drugs in our sample had estimated patient populations 
in the appraisals that were lower than those for many 
23 See: https ://www.fda.gov/forin dustr y/devel oping produ ctsfo rrare disea sesco 
nditi ons/howto apply foror phanp roduc tdesi gnati on/ucm36 4750.htm.
24 See page 805 in the document available at: https ://docs.house .gov/bills 
thisw eek/20171 218/CRPT-115HR PT-466.pdf.
25 See Appendix 3 for a detailed information about clinical success rates per 
phase of development.
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orphan drugs in the sample.26 Therefore, if patient pop-
ulation sizes were to be used as part of an argument to 
allow an adjusted threshold for orphan drugs, such a pol-
icy would require increased accuracy in the estimation 
of target patient populations and an understanding that 
the eligibility of an orphan drug for an adjusted threshold 
could be lost if the total patient population size were to 
increase beyond that typically designated ‘orphan’. Addi-
tionally, the policy should be designed to prevent poten-
tial perverse incentives to strategically narrow/stratify 
the scope of patients licenced in order to obtain higher 
prices. One approach to tackle any perverse incentives 
to expand patient populations by either approving medi-
cines for multiple orphan and non-orphan indications 
and/or strategically narrowing/stratifying patient popula-
tions, would be to take the cumulative total patient popu-
lation across all indications for the CET adjustment.27
Sixth, we are aware that all drug prices, orphan and 
non-orphan, are subject to confidential discounts in 
many settings. Since the method described here estab-
lishes a reasonable price through an adjustment of the 
CET, the price that the policy maker of each country 
actually pays would be the one used to consider whether 
the drug was cost-effective, and not the published list 
price. However, we cannot observe confidential dis-
counts. The existence of confidential discounts would 
only be problematic for our analysis if they were differ-
ent as between the two types of drug. We have no reason 
to expect them to differ, so we make the assumption that 
they do not.
Seventh, we have used patient population sizes as a 
predictor of the likely revenue generated from the sales 
of the various products in the sample, at the price implied 
by the adjusted threshold in each case. However, it could 
be the case that the market exclusivity granted to orphan 
products means that revenue generation could be main-
tained for a given patient population for a longer period 
than that non-orphan drugs, since the latter would be 
more vulnerable to the entry of new, competitor prod-
ucts, including generics. Therefore, in the base case we 
assumed that a non-orphan product would only be used 
in 50% of the total patient population, due to the emer-
gence of competitors.
The use of so many assumptions means that there 
is considerable uncertainty around the estimates of 
the adjusted CETs our method has produced. This 
uncertainty is explored in the sensitivity analysis. How-
ever, if our method were applied in practice, it may be 
feasible to obtain more accurate data for many of the 
parameters. We propose that industry wide data on R&D 
costs be used, together with bands of population size. 
Adjusting CETs by bands of patient population sizes 
avoids a ‘cost-plus’ pricing policy based on a company’s 
actual costs, which would give no incentives for efficien-
cies in research and development, be hard to verify, and 
need, somehow, to take account of failures.
Also, although we have suggested potential adjust-
ments to the threshold ICER for orphan drugs, we have 
retained the standard cost per QALY rubric. Despite 
orphan status, it seems reasonable to expect products to 
show evidence of QALY gains, thereby maintaining the 
principle of assessing cost-effectiveness. However, some 
would argue that it is unreasonable to require orphan 
drugs to meet the same evidential standards as non-
orphans, given their smaller patient populations and the 
likely lower level of understanding of the disease process 
[30]. This may be the case for many ultra-orphan prod-
ucts, but our research shows that oncology orphans often 
have trial population sizes equivalent to non-orphan can-
cer drugs. Furthermore, the trend for the FDA and EMA 
to offer various ‘accelerated approval’ programmes means 
that many oncology products, both orphan and non-
orphan, will be licensed based on less extensive clinical 
data.
Finally, adopting this approach for establishing a rea-
sonable price for an orphan drug does not tackle the 
broader issue of determining appropriate research pri-
orities for the development of orphan drugs, or drugs in 
general. A value-based pricing policy not only ensures 
that the therapies adopted by the health care system 
are good value for money; it also encourages a shift in 
manufacturer research strategy towards delivering prod-
ucts that produce high added value in population health 
terms. Determining a reasonable price for the orphan 
drugs based on allowing a reasonable rate of return does 
not, of itself, appropriately drive the direction of future 
research. One could argue that allowing a higher CET for 
specialized services, as in the English NHS, but to limit 
this to £300,000 per QALY, is one way of sending such a 
signal to manufacturers. Namely, society may be willing 
to offer a reward to manufacturers for developing drugs 
for rare conditions, but this reward may not be as high as 
that to manufacturers developing drugs that have a major 
impact on population health.
This is a societal value judgment that we are not quali-
fied to make. However, according to our data, the cur-
rently proposed CET for ultra-orphans in the UK—at 
its maximum of £300 k per QALY—would guarantee the 
average industry rate of return for most orphan drugs 
27 The use of such an approach should be subject to revision over time 
since, if implemented as a ‘one time’ policy for a particular orphan drug, it 
could generate perverse incentives for companies to use the profit maxim-
ising strategy of not developing the medicine for additional indications if 
that would threaten the medicine’s orphan designation or adversely affect 
its price as calculated by this method. This would negatively affect patients’ 
health.
26 A table with the 10 oncology products is shown in Appendix 5.
Page 12 of 18Berdud et al. Cost Eff Resour Alloc           (2020) 18:31 
with patient populations as low as 3.2 per 50,000, but not 
for the target populations for drugs designated ‘ultra-
orphan’ (i.e. 1 per 50,000 individuals). Therefore, there 
remains a case for having more discussion of priorities 
for research into rare diseases, given the large number 
of very rare diseases for which drugs could potentially be 
developed.
Conclusions
Our research proposes one method for establishing 
the reasonable price for an orphan drug, based on the 
proposition that the expected return for developing an 
orphan should be no greater than the industry average. 
Assuming prices for drugs are set according to value 
added, the method proposes the adjustment that would 
need to be made to a payer’s “normal” cost-effective-
ness threshold (CET) for non-orphan drugs in order to 
ensure that orphan drug developers achieve the indus-
try-wide rate of return.
Our estimates of adjusted CETs—by the R&D cost 
and expected revenues—establish that, using our data 
sources and assumptions, the cost-effectiveness thresh-
old for orphans would need to be higher in order to 
secure a price for orphan drugs that enables the manu-
facturer to achieve a rate of return equivalent to that 
from non-orphan drugs. Furthermore, the threshold 
would also need to increase as the targeted patient pop-
ulation size decreases.
Further research is required, to improve the estimates 
and assumptions of key parameters (i.e. other relative 
operational costs, treatment populations sizes, aver-
age health gains, relative direct cost savings, degree 
of in-class competition for orphan and non-orphan 
drugs, etc.). In addition, society still needs to tackle the 
broader issue of determining appropriate research pri-
orities for the development of orphan drugs.
Finally, results do not indicate what society should be 
prepared to pay for an orphan drug, since this involves 
societal judgments about whether some popula-
tion health in total should be forgone in order to pro-
vide funding for treatments for rare conditions. Our 
research should be viewed as one way of determining 
the maximum price society should be willing to pay to 
ensure a reasonable rate of return.
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Appendix 1
For a formal development of our approach consider the 
following notation:
t = 0 : research starts
PD : patent or other form of exclusivity duration in 
number of years
t = TP : point of patenting
t = TL : point of market launch
t = TEx = TP + PD : point of patent expiration or 
other form of exclusivity
t = 0, . . . ,TP, . . . ,TL, . . . ,TEx : drug’s life-cycle
δ : discount factor
Pno : price non-orphan
Po : price orphan
Pno/c : price non-orphan comparator
Po/c : price orphan comparator
qtno : quantity non-orphan (equal to comparator) in 
period t
qto : quantity orphan (equal to comparator) in period t
R
t
no : R&D cost of a non-orphan in period t
R
t
o : R&D cost of an orphan in period t
C
t
no : other components of the cost of a non-orphan 
(marketing, manufacturing, distribution) in period t
C
t
o : other components of the cost of an orphan (mar-
keting, manufacturing, distribution) in period t
πno : return for a non-orphan developer (current 
value at t = 0)
πo : return for an orphan developer (current value at 
t = 0)
Bno : per patient health gain non-orphan
Bo : per patient health gain orphan
Bno/c : per patient health gain alternative (therapy) 
to non-orphan
Bo/c : per patient health gain alternative (therapy) to 
orphan
CET : cost effectiveness threshold
Pno = Pno/c = Po = Po/c = 0, ∀t ∈ [0 , TL)
qtno = q
t










o = 0, ∀t ∈ [0 , TL)
Let the Incremental Cost Effectiveness Ratio (ICER) for 
a non-orphan be:
Payers and/or HTA agencies fix the CET which ICER 
must not overcome for a reimbursement recommenda-
tion. Substituting the ICER by the CET, then we have 
that,
Assuming value-based prices, a non-orphan drug 
developer will set the price as follows:
Analogously an orphan developer will set the price as 
follows:
Let the return for a non-orphan drug developer be:
Analogously the return for an orphan drug developer 
will be:
Following our approach for a reasonable price of an 
orphan drug, both returns should be equal and therefore 
we have that,
Using (1) and (2) into (3) and assuming that the cost 
effectiveness threshold for an orphan CETo must be dif-
ferent from the CET  as our reasonable pricing approach 
establishes, we have that,
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where CETO represents the adjusted cost effectiveness 
threshold for an orphan drug. Under perfect informa-
tion about health benefits, prices and quantities of new 
orphan and non-orphan drugs and their comparators, as 
well as for R&D costs and other components of the cost 
for orphans and non-orphans, CET could be adjusted by 
applying (4) to calculate a reasonable value-based price 
for each new orphan drug. However, collecting accurate 
data for all variables involved in (4) is beyond the scope 
of this work.28 Therefore, in order to apply our proposed 
approach to the data we have been able to collect (i.e. 
population sizes and R&D costs), it is necessary to make 
assumptions about several components of (4). We set out 
our assumptions below:
• Cost and health benefits for both comparators, 
orphan and non-orphan drugs, are equal to zero: 
Po/c = Pno/c = 0 and Bo/c = Bno/c = 0.
• Equal variable costs (manufacturing, distribution, 
etc.) of orphans and non-orphans: C tno = C
t
o.
• Average health gain per patient for non-orphan drugs 
equal to one: Bno = 1.
• Equal average health gain per patient for orphans and 
non-orphans: Bo = Bno.

























































where CET  is the Cost Effectiveness Threshold; qno is the 
average population of non-orphan, qo is the cut-off (alter-
natively the average) population of orphan; Rno is the 
R&D cost of a non-orphan; and Ro is the R&D cost of an 
orphan.
Additionally, for the adjustment of the CET we also 
want to differentiate between orphan—from now on 
noted by the subscript o—and ultra-orphan drugs—from 
now on noted with the subscript uo. For this purpose, we 
want to make a specific assumption for ultra-orphans:
• Variable costs (manufacturing, distribution, etc.) of 
ultra-orphans are lower than variable costs of non-






Applying this additional specific assumption for ultra-
orphans to (4) and keeping all other assumptions for 
orphan drugs constant we have that:
where, in addition to (5), qtuo is the cut-off (alternatively 
the average) population of ultra-orphan in period t; Cno is 
the variable cost of a non-orphan; C tuo is the variable cost 
of an ultra-orphan in period t; and Rtuo is the R&D cost of 

























28 Perfect knowledge of costs and of numbers of patients would still require 
judgements around (i) failure rates and the costs associated with failures and 
(ii) the allocation of global fixed costs across individual country markets. Our 
view is that it makes more sense to use industry-wide evidence on relative 
costs and failure rates rather than seek to establish the costs associated with a 
particular drug. The latter approach raises efficiency issues (it risks becoming 
a cost-plus system) as well as putting requiring cost information which may 
not be forthcoming, and judgements about shares of global cost burden which 
may be disputed.




The impact of the several assumptions made for the 
adjustment of the CETs was assessed by performing dif-
ferent sensitivity analyses. One feature of orphan drugs is 
the absence of competitors during the patent period. This 
is due firstly because of rarity, which hinders the develop-
ment of treatments and therefore the likelihood of other 
competitors for the same disease,29 and secondly because 
of the market exclusivity period new orphan drugs are 
granted in the US (7 years)30 and the EU (10 years).31 This 
is a different context than the one characterising non-
orphan drugs developed to treat common diseases, where 
competition is common place and drugs have to compete 
for market share with other in-class competitors.
For the estimation of the base case CETs we assumed a 
length of 10 years of market exclusivity for orphan drugs 
and a 50% of market share for non-orphans. Additionally, 
for the estimation of the CETs we assumed the popula-
tions in Table 5 of this paper. Therefore, we conducted a 
sensitivity analysis of the impact of these assumptions on 
the adjusted CET, using the ranges shown in Table 6.
The sensitiveness of CETs to the six assumptions 
assessed is presented in Fig. 8 in absolute terms.
As Fig.  8  shows, the impact of assuming different 
lengths for the market exclusivity period for orphans is 
the lowest. This is because the way in which our alge-
braic approach works minimises the impact of the mar-
ket exclusivity assumption.32 The sensitivity of the CETs 






















Fig. 7 Probabilities of Success in percentage (%). Phase 1; phase 
2; phase 3; NDA/BLA review and approval (Source: Biomedtracker 
| Informa, 2019)
Table 5 Assumptions and variations for sensitivities
a Values standardised per 50,000 inhabitants
b Values of market share
Sensitivity − 20% Base case + 20%
Non-orphan population  sizea 80 100 120
Competition in non-orphan  marketsb 40% 50% 60%
Market exclusivity of orphans 8 years 10 years 12 years
29 See Milne [31], the recently published report of the Tufts Center for Drug 
Development.
30 See: https ://www.fda.gov/ForIn dustr y/Devel oping Produ ctsfo rRare Disea 
sesCo nditi ons/ucm23 9698.htm.
31 See: http://www.ema.europ a.eu/ema/index .jsp?curl = pages /regul ation /
gener al/gener al_conte nt_00039 2.jsp.
32 Adding/reducing 2  years the market exclusivity for orphan and ultra-
orphan drugs, increases/reduces the profit of orphan drug’s developer during 
farthest periods. The impact over the CET adjustment then results minimised 
as their value is time-discounted several periods from t = TEx to t = 0.




































c                                     Ultra-orphan cut-off base case: £936,810/QALY
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to the rest of the assumptions seems to be proportional, 
and constant across for each CETs (orphan cut-off, 
mid-point of the orphan cut-off, ultra-orphan cut-off). 
Changes of equal measure and sign around the assump-
tions of non-orphan average populations and in-class 
competition for non-orphans also produce equivalent 
variations as Fig. 8 shows. This is because both have the 
same impact on the final aggregate non-orphan treat-
ment populations.
Additionally, we assess the sensitivity of the adjusted 
CET for ultra-orphan drugs to the assumption that 
other components of the life-cycle cost of ultra-orphans 
(e.g. commercialisation, manufacturing, distribution) go 
down in the same proportion than the R&D cost. Table 6 
compares the adjusted CETs for both, orphan and ultra-
orphan drugs, under the two different assumptions 
applied to lifecycle costs other than the R&D. Estimates 
in the table show that the assumption represents a mini-
mum impact. For orphans, assuming all costs decrease in 
the same proportion reduces the adjusted CET by 4.4% 
(£1726). For ultra-orphans, assuming that only the R&D 
costs decrease while other life-cycle cost components 
remain constant increases the adjusted CET by 4.4% 
(£43,149).
(See figure on next page.)
Fig. 8 Sensitivity analyses: variations in absolute values. a Variance on the adjusted CET for orphan cut-off; b variance on the adjusted CET for 
mid-point of the orphan cut-off; c variance on the adjusted CET for ultra-orphan cut-off (Source: Authors calculations)
Table 6 Sensitivity of  the  adjusted CET for  ultra-orphans to  the  R&D and  other life-cycle costs assumption. Source: 
authors’ calculations
Base case estimates are shown in italics
All costs decrease in the same proportion than the R&D 
cost
Only R&D costs 
decrease for ultra‑
orphan drugs
Orphan cut-off point £37,534 £39,260
Ultra-orphan cut-off point £938,358 £981,507
Table 7 Non-orphan oncology drugs and indications. Source: EMA and NICE
Name Indication
Lonsurf To treat adult patients with metastatic colorectal cancer (CRC) who have been previously treated with, or are not considered candidates for, 
available therapies including fluoropyrimidine-oxaliplatin- and irinotecan-based chemotherapy, an anti-VEGF biological therapy, and an 
anti-EGFR therapy
Kadcyla To treat (adult) patients with HER2-positive, unresectable locally advanced or metastatic breast cancer who have received prior treatment 
with trastuzumab and a taxane
Xofigo To treat men with symptomatic late-stage (metastatic) castration-resistant prostate cancer that has spread to bones but not to other organs
Inlyta To treat patients with advanced kidney cancer (renal cell carcinoma) who have not responded to another drug for this type of cancer
Perjeta To treat patients with HER2-positive late-stage (metastatic) breast cancer in combination with Herceptin and docetaxel
Xtandi To treat men with late-stage (metastatic) castration-resistant prostate cancer who have received docetaxel therapy
Zytiga In combination with prednisone (a steroid) to treat patients with late-stage (metastatic) castration-resistant prostate cancer who have 
received prior docetaxel (chemotherapy)
Appendix 5
See Table 7.
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